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Raya Dunayevskaya, 1910 to 1987, Marxist Economist and Philosopher

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ABSTRACT: Raya Dunayevskaya's theory of state capitalism, first developed in the 1940s as an analysis of Stalin's Russia, is here related to her subsequent work (1953–87) on Hegel, on Marxist humanism and on Marxism and feminism. Her concept of Hegel's "absolute negativity as new beginning" is connected to her voluminous writings on Marx's major works: *1844 Essays, Grundrisse, Capital, Ethnological Notebooks.* Contrasts and comparisons are drawn to the writings of others on these issues including Lange, James, Marcuse, Geras, Markovic, Rosdolsky, Krader and Shanin.

Raya Dunayevskaya's sudden death on June 9, 1987 was a tremendous loss to Marxist thought in the United States and worldwide. Russian-born, she came from a generation with direct links both to the Russian revolution and to the battles against Stalinism in the 1930s, when she served as Trotsky's Russian secretary. Dunayevskaya went on to develop a theory of state capitalism in the 1940s, and a philosophy of Marxist-Humanism beginning in the 1950s. She leaves behind four books and over 10,000 pages of other writings on Marxian and revolutionary thought, much of the latter on deposit at the Wayne State University Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs in Detroit as the Raya Dunayevskaya Collection. In the last months of her life, she had been working on a book project entitled "Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy: The 'Party' and New Forms Arising Out of Spontaneity" (Dunayevskaya 1988:10664–11001) which will now, sadly, remain unfinished. Since it is clearly impossible to cover here the rich totality of Dunayevskaya's work, I will concentrate on two key issues in her theoretical writings: state capitalism and Marx's humanism.

STATE CAPITALISM

Having broken with Trotsky, who continued to consider Stalin's Soviet Union to be a "workers' state, though degenerate," even as the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 paved the way for World War II, Dunayevskaya began from 1941 on to elaborate a theory of state capitalism under the pen-name Freddie Forest. In this period she worked with a colleague, the Trinidad-born theorist C. L. R. James, who wrote under the name J. R. Johnson. Their "Johnson-Forest Tendency" continued in several political forms both inside and then outside Trotskyism until 1955, when irreconcilable theoretical differences arose between Dunayevskaya and James. After 1955 Dunayevskaya developed her own concept of

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Marxist-Humanism alone, establishing the paper *News & Letters,* while James became a Pan-Africanist and a supporter of Third World nationalist regimes such as Nkrumah's Ghana.

In the 1960s Mao's designation of the Soviet Union as state capitalist made state capitalism into a virtual cliché, but that does not detract from the historic originality of Dunayevskaya's concept of state capitalism, first worked out in the 1940s. Unfortunately, the now numerous academic accounts of these developments are sketchy and often inaccurate.[1] Cleaver (1979) caught much of the originality of various Johnson-Forest concepts, although he was apparently misled at the time into crediting James alone with jointly worked out writings and ideas.[2] In an otherwise tendentious appraisal, one recent Australian study does recognize that "of the two, Dunayevskaya performed the more detailed analysis of Hegel, Marx and the USSR" (Beilharz 1987:107). Earlier, Jerome and Buick (1967) had traced various Marxian theories of state capitalism, noting that Dunayevskaya "was the first to provide a detailed analysis of any length of the meaning and function of state capitalism in the USSR" (68). Unfortunately Jerome and Buick were seemingly unaware that James and Dunayevskaya had diverged in 1955. Dunayevskaya's own retrospective accounts (Dunayevskaya 1980a; Phillips and Dunayevskaya 1984) stress her differences with James even in the 1940s, albeit not directly over the concept of state capitalism.

As Jerome and Buick noted, Dunayevskaya's analysis was empirical and detailed, painstakingly worked out from very sketchy and sometimes deliberately contradictory official USSR statistics. Her three-part series of articles, published in 1942–43 in the Marxist theoretical journal *New International,* offered one of the first detailed accounts anywhere of the terrible famine of the 1930s as well as overall labor conditions in Stalin's Russia. She concluded for example that by 1937 the real wages of Russian workers had decreased to half their 1928 levels and that unexpectedly low population figures from the 1939 census seemed to indicate that over 15 million people had perished in the 1930s. The conclusion to this series on the concept of state capitalism was not published until 1946–47, apparently due to resistance from the editorial board of *New International,* then dominated by Max Shachtman, who held a bureaucratic collectivist position on the nature of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless the articles drew wide attention among the "New York intellectuals" of the period. Arthur Koestler, at that time still on the left, used them for his own analysis "Soviet Myth and Reality," originally published in 1945 (Koestler 1965).

In her 1946–47 conclusion to the articles, Dunayevskaya took as her point of departure the discussion by Marx in *Capital* (I) that even if the market were replaced by planning and a centralized "single capitalist" controlled the economy, it would not affect the underlying law of value and surplus value (Dunayevskaya 1973; Marx 1976:779). She concluded that Stalin's USSR took the form of such a totally centralized "single capitalist society." The fetishism of commodities had been replaced by the fetishism of state property:

> State capitalism brings about a change in the mode of appropriation, as has occurred so often in the life span of capitalism, through its competitive, monopoly and state-monopoly stages . . . This pressure in Russia is exerted, not through competition, but state planning (Dunayevskaya 1973:21).

She constructed a detailed portrait not only of the conditions of labor, but also of the structure of the new ruling class.

From the beginning Dunayevskaya's analysis based itself explicitly on Marxist dialectics as well as economics, developing for example one of the first discussions anywhere of Marx's *1844 Essays* in an introduction to the analysis of the USSR entitled "Labor and Society," written in 1942 and refused publication by *New International* (Dunayevskaya 1986a:87–101). She quoted Marx's view of individuality — "It is especially necessary to avoid ever again to counterpose 'society' as an abstraction, to the individual" — in order to attack the view that Stalin's collectivizations were historically progressive. Because of her knowledge of Russian she had access not only to Soviet economic data and theoretical discussions, but perhaps even more important, to works of Marx which were not available to English or even German readers until decades later.

Dunayevskaya was especially concerned with Marxist theory, not only as the underpinning of her own analysis of the Soviet economy, but also as a critique of Stalinist ideology. This became critical when she translated a key 1943 article, "Teaching of Economics in the Soviet Union," where official Soviet ideologists had written that "denying the operation of the law of value in socialist society created insurmountable difficulties" and that instead they had developed a more satisfactory "premise that under socialism the law of value functions" (Leontiev et al. 1944). She published the translation of the article in the *American Economic Review* where she also wrote an incisive analysis of it from a state capitalist vantage point (Dunayevskaya 1944). She singled out as well the Soviet ideologists' proposal to teach *Capital* in chronological order, a step which she considered to be a violation of its dialectical structure. After Baran (1944), Lange (1945) and Rogin (1945) each wrote sharply critical responses, her own rejoinder stressed that with the admission that the law of value still operated, "Soviet economic theory finally reflects (state capitalist) economic reality" (Dunayevskaya 1945). She held that the Russian article reflected a revision of Marxism which could then function as a new state ideology for continued capital accumulation in the postwar period.

The lengthy 1950 statement *State Capitalism and World Revolution* which was signed "Johnson-Forest" has been recently reissued as a book with the authorship given as C. L. R. James "written in collaboration with Raya Dunayevskaya and Grace Lee" (James 1986). However, this book lacks the detailed economic analysis of the writings on state capitalism which Dunayevskaya wrote alone.[3]

She developed a new Marxist-Humanist dialectic in the period 1953–57. This emerged out of her studies of Hegel, as well as they early and mature Marx, which took her beyond the concept of dialectics underpinning the Marxism of the Johnson-Forest Tendency. The fullest development of her own concept of state capitalism is in *Marxism and Freedom,* originally published in 1958, where the detailed economic analysis is presented within an overall humanist dialectic which also stresses mass resistance to Stalinism inside the Soviet Union itself.

Far from only a USSR phenomenon, this discussion saw state capitalism as a new world stage of the development of capitalism as a whole, following its earlier competitive and monopoly stages:

> State capitalism is not a continuous development of capitalism in the sense of a development without breaks. It is a development through transformation into opposite. Capitalism lived and progressed by free competition. Hence, it found its fullest development under democratic bourgeois or parliamentary democracy. State capitalism means, and can only mean, bureaucracy, tyranny and barbarism as could have been seen in Nazi Germany and can be seen in totalitarian Russia. One would have to be blind not to see the elements of it everywhere, including the United States (Dunayevskaya 1989:258).

Elements of state capitalism in America encompassed, on the one hand, the New Deal's state intervention into the economy, and on the other, the rise of the military and police apparatus of the modern American system, today termed the national security state.

In addition, Dunayevskaya now stressed that state capitalism, East or West, engendered forms of social resistance, especially by workers. She entitled her 1958 discussion in *Marxism and Freedom,* "The Problem of Our Age: State Capitalism vs. Freedom," and divided it into two sections, one on Russia (212–57) and the other on America (258–87). She developed an intricate analysis from Marx's *Capital,* showing that plan and market are not true opposites, and arguing that alienated labor, not planlessness, is the hallmark of capitalism.

This brought her to a re-appropriation of Marx's concept of commodity fetishism for the theory of state capitalism:

> In Russia, where the society is completely state capitalist, the bourgeois fetishism of commodities seems to be overcome. In a sense it is. The Russian bureaucrats are not affected by problems of the market, nor confused by ideas of equal exchange, as are the bourgeois economists (Dunayevskaya 1989:238–239).

But, she contended, commodity fetishism was for Marx rooted not in the market, but rather in production relations:

> But another aspect of fetishism, *the* critical one that Marx uncovered, was the *perversity* of relations between machine and man where dead labor dominates over living labor. That is why Marx is so insistent in saying that the *form* of the commodity is fantastic, not because it is not true, but because it correctly reflects the *real* relations at the point of production (Dunayevskaya 1989:239).

Since the Soviet ruling class has not and could not have abolished alienated labor:

> This fetishism not only has not been overcome in Russia, the Plan has perfected it and become a prisoner of it. They have substituted for fetishism of commodities the fetishism of the Plan. But their Plan turns out to be no more than a disguise for the actual relations of production in the factory . . . In reality, therefore, the State Plan is nothing but the organization of the proletariat to produce under the domination of the machine (Dunayevskaya 1989:239).

Dunayevskaya grounded the above analysis in the 1944–45 controversy over the teaching of economics in the Soviet Union. She now gave greater stress to how the Soviet ideologists (Leontiev et al. 1944) had, in addition to admitting that the Marxian law of value still operated in the Soviet Union, set up a new framework for teaching *Capital*, which skipped the first chapter on commodities with its section on fetishism altogether, and began instead with the historical section on primitive accumulation. She noted later that this Stalinist proposal anticipated

Althusser's essentially similar one by over twenty years (Dunayevskaya 1982a; Althusser 1971).

The revision of the dialectical form of *Capital* had to occur because, she writes:

> No Russian worker could see the difference between his "socialist labor" and that which was described by Marx as capitalism, alienated labor. The questions asked by students were likewise unanswerable, hence the teaching of political economy was stopped altogether (Dunayevskaya 1989:238).

These problems necessitated the changes in teaching economics.

In *Marxism and Freedom,* Dunayevskaya continued the type of detailed analysis of the Soviet economy which she had done in the 1940s, but her new Marxist-Humanist standpoint now placed a broad critique of the state capitalist plan at its center: "The experience of Russia since 1936 has exploded the idea that planning by any other class than the proletariat can ever reverse the law of motion of capitalist society" (228).[4] This critique of the plan was applied as well to the new U.S. industrial relations specialists: "This is the fact from which all contemporary sociology and social psychology begins: the rejection by the workers of all the old capitalist controls and standards" (261). Both American wildcat strikes and East European revolts were seen as examples of resistance to state capitalism.

Dunayevskaya continued her writings on state capitalism after the 1950s. Her 1959/1961 study of the Afro-Asian revolutions (Dunayevskaya 1984a) extended the concept to the Third World, where the new nations were hemmed in by a bipolar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, and their leaders faced the temptation of state capitalist planning from above, whether in India, in Africa or most of all, in China. Another important discussion (Dunayevskaya 1967) critiqued Luxemburg's accumulation theory, Bukharin's writings on transition and analyzed Mao's China as a state capitalist society.[5] Later came the chapter on "State Capitalism and the East European Revolts" in *Philosophy and Revolution* (Dunayevskaya 1982a) and many more recent discussions on Poland's Solidarnosc or on Andropov and Gorbachev in *News & Letters.*

MARX'S HUMANISM: DIALECTICS AND ECONOMICS

Beginning in the 1950s, Dunayevskaya grappled directly with Hegelian dialectics, having been drawn into this subject when in 1948 she made a translation of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* for her colleagues C. L. R. James and Grace Lee. By 1953, shortly before their parting of the ways, she wrote two substantial letters to Lee on the dialectic in Hegel's Absolutes in their varying forms in three of his major works: *Phenomenology, Science of Logic,* and *Philosophy of Mind.* In particular, she brought out for the first time by any Marxist the liberatory potential of Hegel's concept of "self-thinking idea" with which he ended the *Philosophy of Mind.* Dunayevskaya tied this concept to the new social movements which arose after World War II: Blacks, rank and file labor, women and youth. She saw the new social movements as the type of self-development of the revolutionary subject that the state-capitalist age had ushered in, using Hegel's self-thinking idea to characterize the new movements

not only as the "self-bringing forth of freedom," but also as a movement from practice "which is itself a form of theory." This was developed first in the 1953 letters (Dunayevskaya 1986a:1797–1812) and later in her books, beginning with *Marxism and Freedom*.

To be sure, Dunayevskaya saw Hegel's central contribution to be his dialectic of "freedom" and of "negativity," but unlike other Marxists such as Herbert Marcuse (1941) or Georg Lukacs (1975), she plunged directly into Hegel's Absolutes as the source of her own "revolutionary dialectics." She grounded her Marxist-Humanism in what she termed "absolute negativity as new beginning." In her paper presented to the Hegel Society of America, she began by quoting Hegel's *Science of Logic* on the Absolute Idea "containing the highest opposition in itself" (Dunayevskaya 1980b:163), stressing the open character of Hegel's dialectic, even at the level of his Absolute Idea.[6]

Sometimes linked to critical theory or existential Marxism, the heterogenous development of Marxist humanism[7] based itself on the humanist content of Marx's work, especially the early Marx. All of the key Marxist humanists also opposed established communism (Fromm 1961, 1965; Kolakowski 1968; Svitak 1970; Markovic 1974; Kosik 1978), sometimes as state capitalism. Recently another writer and I have stressed that Marxist humanism can be considered to have important differences from critical theory and existential Marxism (Jay 1985; Anderson 1986). Dunayevskaya's contribution to Fromm's *Socialist Humanism* (Dunayevskaya 1965) and two histories which she wrote of the development of her own concept of Marxist-Humanism (Dunayevskaya 1980a, 1986b) show her relationship to these sources of Marxist-Humanism.

Where other Marxist humanists centered their work around studies of the young Marx and the dialectic in an East European context, Dunayevskaya's version developed in a somewhat broader context, additionally out of a dialogue in the 1950s with both American civil rights and labor movements as well as the African liberation struggle, especially by the 1960s the writings on revolutionary humanism of Frantz Fanon (1968). She stressed that where the activist movements of the 1960s had tended to neglect theory altogether, in the 1950s new discussions of radical humanism had accompanied the actual revolts, especially in East Europe where new discussions of the young Marx were undertaken. In her chapter on East Europe in *Philosophy and Revolution,* Dunayevskaya (1982a) conveyed the sweep of both the revolt and the philosophical probing by East European Marxist humanists.

In the 1970s Althusserian and other variants of anti-humanist theorizing gained headway, but as one British theorist, Kate Soper (1987:102), has noted, there is today "a climate of opinion less susceptible than that of a decade ago to the lure of 'anti-humanist' Marxism." Even formerly "anti-humanist" Marxist such as Norman Geras, now faced with the challenge of new post-Althusserian French trends terming themselves not only anti-humanist, but also "post-Marxist," have addressed the issue of "human nature" in Marx, while still keeping their distance not only from Hegel, but especially from the explicit "new humanism" of Marx's *1844 Essays* (Geras 1983).

In a more recent debate with the "post-Marxists" Laclau and Mouffe, Geras lists what he still evidently considers to be the "standard Marxist positions": (1) "class position is the primary historical determinant," (2) "the metaphor of

base and superstructure is a theoretically viable one," (3) "the working class has an objective interest in socialism," (4) "socialism" and not merely "radical democracy" is the goal, (5) "society and history can be rendered intelligible by some unifying principle" (Geras 1987:43–44). In short, class structure, socialism, and "some unifying principle" (dialectics? structuralism? — he does not say) are what he singles out to sum up Marx's world view.

In sharp contrast to Geras, Dunayevskaya offered a broad dialectical view of Marx in her brief discussion on what she termed "the vision in the general principles of Historical Materialism":

> . . . the material, objective conditions of human existence, the self-development of labor, of the laborer, as against any "objective" development of mind; the historical processes as against any "eternal truths"; dialectical development through contradictions as against any mechanical, or abstract, contemplative or merely empiric continuity of that which is — is as inseparable from the "mature" Marx as from the young (Dunayevskaya 1982a:60).

Increasingly, it is seen that only such a fully dialectical, humanist Marxism can meet the challenge of today, whether from "post-Marxists" or from the new social movements themselves.

Thus Soper's (1986) *Humanism and Anti-Humanism,* while admittedly Sartrean in its emphasis, nonetheless gives a serious hearing to Marxist humanism, including Dunayevskaya's work. Soper develops an explicit critique of the anti-humanist thought of Althusser, Foucault, and Derrida. In order to do so, she takes a journey into the young Marx and Hegel's *Phenomenology,* but stops short of any consideration of Hegel's Absolute Knowledge as anything other than a "plateau" (47), arguing (contra Dunayevskaya) that "philosophy cannot start with the Absolute" (31). As against Geras, however, this does not mean a turn completely away from Hegel since, in Soper's view: "it is not Feuerbach but Hegel whom Marx credits in the *1844 Manuscripts* with exposing, albeit only in its abstract and ahistoric development, the essential nature of this *secular alienation.*" (34) Nor does it mean any simplified concept of materialism since in her view Marx is "arguing for a humanism that unites idealism and materialism" (35).

C. J. Arthur's (1986) *Dialectics of Labour*, another recent British study, relies partly on Dunayevskaya's interpretations of Marx's *1844 Essays,* although his overall perspective is drawn from that of Lukacs. While as Arthur notes, it is true that in his 1844 "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic," Marx "praises Hegel for having grasped man as the result of his own labor" (78), Marx does not concentrate at all on the section on the master and the slave, but rather "discusses the *Phenomenology* as a whole and draws attention to its last chapter especially" (79), the chapter on Absolute Knowledge. Arthur does note Marx's singling out from that chapter of the concept of "absolute negativity" as Hegel's key contribution, but apparently following Lukacs, he does not develop the point positively, as to the relevance of Absolute Knowledge for Marxism today. These discussions within British Marxism in the 1980s show the growing importance of the question of humanism within contemporary Marxism, and in particular that of the Marxist-Humanism developed beginning in the 1950s by Dunayevskaya. In that light, let us proceed to examine some of her writings on Marx's humanism.

The original edition in 1958 of Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* contained her translation into English, the first published anywhere, of two of the most important of Marx's *1844 Essays,* "Private Property and Communism" and "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic." Dunayevskaya focused on Marx's concept of labor in 1844. She considered labor as "first of all the function" of human beings, but "under capitalism" the human being becomes "a mere appendage" of the machine, "alienated labor," in contrast to the "creative function it was under primitive communism" (Dunayevskaya 1989:56). In the reading of Marx's 1844 critique of Hegel, the negative and critical character of Hegel's dialectic, which Marcuse had emphasized, is connected by Dunayevskaya to the positive moment of Marx's "own philosophy of humanism" which "stands to this day as the dividing line between Marxism as the doctrine of liberation, and all who claim the name of 'Marxism,' 'socialism,' or 'communism' while they pursue an entirely different course" (58). She stressed that Marx "first called" his "total outlook . . . *not* 'Communism' but 'Humanism' "(59).

Dunayevskaya cited the young Marx who in the essay "Private Property and Communism" criticized a "vulgar and unthinking communism" which "completely negates the personality" of the human being (59). This led directly to her discussion of present-day established communism which "continues to spend incredible time and energy and vigilance to imprison Marx within the bounds of the private property vs. State property concept" (63), where she accused Soviet ideologists of burying or distorting the humanistic content of Marx's work. In this sense, Marx's concept of alienation acquires a critical philosophical and political dimension.

Marx's humanism, the positive in the negative of alienation, is what illuminates and drives the category of alienated labor here, rather than alienation alone standing as the centerpiece as in so many discussions of the *1844 Essays,* beginning with Marcuse's (1941) rigorous analysis of alienated labor and continuing through the somewhat abstract humanism of Fromm (1961).

Her *Philosophy and Revolution*, originally published in 1973, argued that Marx's 1844 confrontation with Hegel's *Phenomenology,* especially its final chapter "Absolute Knowledge," had made the reader "witness to the origination of the Marxian dialectic" (Dunayevskaya 1982a:59). In her most recent analysis it was not a question so much of Hegel's "influence" on Marx as a question of what Marx developed out of Hegel "which cannot be grasped by singling out 'influences' but by seeing that the *breaking point* (emphasis added), the point of departure from the old, becomes the translucent direction forward" (Dunayevskaya 1982b:128). The year 1844 therefore contains already the whole of Marx in the sense of a universal humanist dialectic having been created in his essay "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic," which, she holds, forms the basis for Marx's subsequent writings.

Dunayevskaya argued that the *Grundrisse* and the *Critique of Political Economy* actually had a more directly Hegelian form than did the finished *Capital.* Despite *Grundrisse's* "more total conception than the logical, precise *Capital,*" and its "tremendous world-historic view," including its "excursion into pre-capitalist societies" (Dunayevskaya 1982a:65–66), she wrote:

> The *Grundrisse* is proof of the limitation but also the indispensability of the dialectic . . . dialectic is not an "applied" science . . . The Marxian dialectic thus transcended and preserved the Hegelian dialectic. Until, however, the Subject, i.e., the proletariat of the 1860s, acted — the strikes and revolts in Europe, the Civil War in the U.S., the black dimension — the dialectical analysis necessarily remained intellectualist . . . (73)

In this sense she later (1978b) criticized Rosdolsky's (1977) near-identification of *Capital* and *Grundrisse,* pointing to Mepham's (1979) critique of Rosdolsky, while in no way agreeing with the downplaying of Hegel by either Mepham or Rosdolsky.

She argued further that "*Capital* . . . is the great divide from Hegel, and not just because the subject is economics rather than philosophy," but because the "Subject, not subject matter" of *Capital* showed a continuity from Marx's humanism of 1844. The subject, she showed, was "the human being," the living worker faced with capital:

> *This* dialectic is therefore totally new, totally internal, deeper than ever was the Hegelian dialectic which had *de*humanized the self-development of humanity in the dialectic of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Reason. Marx could transcend the Hegelian dialectic not by denying that it was the "source of all dialectic"; rather it was precisely because he began with that source that he could make the leap to the live Subject who is the one who transforms reality (Dunayevskaya 1982b:143).

She continued this argument in a detailed analysis of the relationship of Hegel's *Science of Logic* to the first chapter of *Capital,* concluding that where Hegel took over 500 pages to move from appearance to essence to "Notion" (concept), "what Marx confronts us with in the first chapter is not only Appearance and Essence but Notion." (144) In this sense she separated herself even from Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* which had stressed the strong affinities between the form of *Capital* and that of Hegel's *Logic.*

For Dunayevskaya, Marx's humanism was as much of the ground of Vols. II and III as of Vol. I of *Capital.* In *Marxism and Freedom,* she quoted the following passage from Volume III, on going beyond "the realm of necessity":

> Beyond it begins that development of human power which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon the realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise (Dunayevskaya 1989:145).

Then she wrote:

> Thus we see it isn't only the young Marx but the mature Marx to whom the creative role of labor is the key to all else . . . In the *Grundrisse* Marx said that, once the productive process "is stripped of its antagonistic form," "the measure of wealth will then no longer be labor time, but leisure time." The free time liberated from capitalist exploitation would be for the free development of the *individual's powers.* The conception of freedom that the young Marx had when he broke from bourgeois society as a revolutionary Hegelian remained with him throughout his life (Dunayevskaya 1989:145).

She discerned this same thread of humanism as well in Marx's last writings, in which great interest has recently developed, especially on their relationship to the Third World.

Shanin (1983) and his colleagues published in full and debated the drafts of Marx's 1881 letters on the Russian village commune (mir) to Vera Zasulich, while Krader (Marx 1972, 1975) made a painstaking transcription of Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* on primitive and non-Western societies. Krader connected these writings mainly to Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production, while Shanin saw in them an affinity between Marx and Russian Populism. Shanin and his colleagues downplayed the Hegel-Marx relationship while fiercely attacking Engels. Krader saw Hegelian and humanist dimensions to Marx's late writings, but downplayed Marx's differences there with Engels.

Dunayevskaya's analysis of these issues, begun in 1979, saw not a separation but rather a continuity between the concerns of the late Marx and his work as a whole, a theme developed most fully in her 1982 book, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*. At the same time, the new element of Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* led her to look again at Marx's earlier work. One feature which emerged anew here was Marx's relation to women's liberation. Not only did Dunayevskaya view the *Ethnological Notebooks* as a major statement by Marx on women, an issue largely ignored by both Krader and Shanin, but what she saw in the *Ethnological Notebooks* led her to a re-examination of the whole of Marx, from the *1844 Essays* to *Capital*. She found a rich body of material on women's liberation (Dunayevskaya 1984b).[8]

Where Engels' (1972) *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* had seemed to share the anthropologist Morgan's idyllic view of primitive society, Dunayevskaya saw Marx's *Notebooks* as showing that:

> on the contrary . . . elements of oppression in general, and of women in particular, arose from *within* primitive communism, and not only related to change from 'matriarchy,' but beginning with the establishment of ranks — relationship of chief to mass — and the economic interests that accompanied it (Dunayevskaya 1985:213).

This led her in turn to a sharp critique of Engels, to the development of a concept of "post-Marx Marxism" beginning with Engels, a term she used as a pejorative: "Engels' unilinear view led him to mechanical positivism" (Dunayevskaya 1985:268).

> Marx was not hurrying to make easy generalizations, such as Engels characterization of the future being just a "higher stage" of primitive communism. No, Marx envisioned a totally new man, a totally new woman, a totally new life form (and by no means only for marriage) — in a word, a totally new society (Dunayevskaya 1982b:186).

In this sense the underlying theme of Marx's Humanism emerges here in his last writings.

A second element emerging out of her discussion of the late Marx was a new view of Marx and the Third World. Where Engels evidently saw Marx's notes on anthropology as a study of the origins of class society, Dunayevskaya (1982b:185) held that Marx "drew no such unbridgeable gap between primitive and civilized as Engels had" and that his concern was new revolutionary subjects in his own period. In the 1882 preface to the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, co-authored with Engels, Marx "projected the idea that Russia could be the first to have a proletarian revolution ahead of the West."

(187) Where Shanin sees this as a sharp break from Marx's earlier concepts, Dunayevskaya took us through a new reading of Marx's earlier work. She noted for example that the French edition of *Capital* had taken up new material on imperialism. In addition, the section on commodity fetishism had contained a reference to China's Taiping peasant rebellion of the 1850s, which Marx contrasted to the post-1848 quiescence in Europe. In the last year of his life, she recalled, Marx travelled to Algiers, prompting Lafargue to write Engels: "Marx has come back with his head full of Africa and the Arabs" (cited in Dunayevskaya 1982b:191).

This anticipation, and offering of a revolutionary humanist ground for today's Third World revolutions, was another proof, to Dunayevskaya, of the actuality of Marx's humanism, made more explicit by the publication, almost one hundred years after his death, of his last writings. In the conclusion of her *Rosa Luxemburg* book she wrote:

> What is needed is a new unifying principle, on Marx's ground of humanism, that truly alters both human thought and human experience. Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* are a historic happening that proves, one hundred years after he wrote them, that Marx's legacy is no mere heirloom, but a live body of ideas and perspectives that is in need of concretization (Dunayevskaya 1982b:195).

So too with the rich legacy of Raya Dunayevskaya.

NOTES

1. This is especially true of one error-ridden British book which actually has C. L. R. James (1901–1989), as having died in 1976 (Bellis 1979).
2. In a recent book by a writer who acknowledges his "intellectual debt to C. L. R. James" in the preface (Buhle 1987), James in the 1940s is treated at length, especially on state capitalism, but Dunayevskaya is given a single mention.
3. For a late 1940s view by Dunayevskaya, see her book outline "State Capitalism and Marxism," sent at the time to Joan Robinson and included with Robinson's handwritten commentary in Dunayevskaya's papers (Dunayevskaya 1986a:472–502).
4. Dunayevskaya argued these and other points with Ernest Mandel from the 1940s on. For two fairly recent discussions, see her sharp critique of his introduction to *Capital* (Dunayevskaya 1978a) and their direct debate on Trotsky (Dunayevskaya 1977).
5. On China, see also her extensive analysis in the appendices to *Marxism and Freedom*, originally written in the 1960s (Dunayevskaya 1989).
6. Her fullest discussion of this issue was in the first chapter of *Philosophy and Revolution*, (Dunayevskaya 1982a) and in her notes toward the unfinished book "Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy" (Dunayevskaya 1988: 10664–11001). For interesting critiques of her position on Hegel's Absolutes (and her responses), see her lengthy correspondence with Marcuse during the period 1954–78 (Dunayevskaya 1986a:9889–9975) and her dialogue with the non-Marxist Hegel scholar George Armstrong Kelly in the 1982 preface to *Philosophy and Revolution* and elsewhere (Kelly 1978; Dunayevskaya 1988:11216–11227).
7. To avoid confusion I am using Dunayevskaya's own term "Marxist-Humanism" to refer to her ideas, "Marx's humanism" to refer to the humanist content of Marx's own work, and "Marxist humanism" to refer to the broad group of Marxist humanist writings internationally after World War II.
8. Adrienne Rich (1986) has recently discussed Dunayevskaya's contribution to feminist theory at length. See also Dunayevskaya's response to Rich (Dunayevskaya 1988:11293–11309).

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