SOURCES OF MARXIST-HUMANISM: FANON, KOSIK AND DUNAYEVSKAYA

Quarterly Journal of Ideology 10:4 (1986)

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As developed in the 1950's and 1960's by writers such as Frantz Fanon, Karel Kosik and Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxist-Humanism is a challenge to contemporary social theory. Humanism was so central to the thought of the young Marx that he wrote in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844:* "Communism as a fully-developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully-developed humanism is naturalism . . . It is the solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution" (Marx 1961:127). The publication of these writings touched off international debate around the issue of humanism and Marxism (Fromm 1965).

The attempts of Althusser (1969) and others to close off this debate by relegating Marx's humanism only to the young Marx were challenged not only by Marxist-Humanists (Dunayevskaya 1969), but by the wide discussion of Marx's *Grundrisse* in the 1970s. There, too, Marx had underlined his humanism, stressing that:

> "In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productivity forces etc. . . . the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming?" (1973:488).

All of this made intelligible the explicit humanism found once again in the conclusion of Volume III of Marx's *Capital:*

> The realm of freedom really begins only where labor determined by necessity and external expedience ends . . . The true realm of freedom, the development of human power as an end in itself begins beyond it" (1981:958-959).

Grounding themselves in these central humanist categories in Marx, but especially in the young Marx, numerous writers have discussed Marx's humanist and Hegelian roots since the 1950's.

Too often obscured in this discussion has been the variety of views among the writers who have taken up these issues. Neo-Marxists—whether in the German "Frankfurt School" or the French "Existential Marxists"—were and are distinct from each other and from Marxist-Humanism. Neo-Marxism generally involves revising central Marxist categories in order to integrate Marx's thought with non-Marxian social theory; such as Freudianism, existentialism, phenomenology or Weberianism. In the case of the Frankfurt School this meant an explicit critique of Marxist-Humanism, but one which did not answer *contemporary* Marxist-Humanists.

Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School eventually drew even the far more revolutionary-minded Herbert Marcuse to his own rejection, not only of the working class as a revolutionary subject, but even of the possibility of a society free of alienation and reification (Marcuse 1964). In the seventies Marcuse, in a conversation with Raya Dunayevskaya, questioned what Marx "meant" by his phrase in *Critique of the Gotha Program* on a new socialist society where "labor," from a mere means life, has become the prime necessity of life" (Dunayevskaya 1979). As a recent account puts it: "In short, for all its fury against the reification and alienation fostered by capitalism, the Frankfurt

School could not join the Marxist-Humanists in positing a world entirely free of those conditions" (Jay 1985). Neither could the French existentialists, Sartre and Mereleau-Ponty. Jay errs, however, in considering Georg Lukacs' and Karl Korsch's writings in the 1920's as Marxist-Humanist. These Hegelian Marxists were truly original, but they never made a central category out of humanism. Nor did they discuss the *1844 Essays* in a comprehensive way once they were published in German in 1932.

Marxist-Humanism arose in the 1950's as a heterogenous school of thought, more than a decade after the Frankfurt School had developed its views. The starting point for Marxist-Humanism was the discussion of the writings of the young Marx as the foundation for a Marxist critique both of established Marxism and of non-Marxian social theory. It also had distinct political implications, as seen in Dunayevskaya's call in the early 1960's for the unity of the East European, U.S. and African Marxist-Humanists:

> Just as the fight for freedom on the part of the Hungarian revolutionaries (who had been raised on Marxian theory only to be betrayed by its usurpers) has made them theoretical Marxist-Humanists, the plunge to freedom has made the African revolutionaries the activist Marxist-Humanists of today. The Marxist-Humanists of other lands are ready to listen and, with your help, to establish that new international which will be free from state control and will aspire to reconstruct the world (Dunayevskaya 1963).

Marxist-Humanism thus arose some time after the Lukacs, Existential Marxists and the Frankfurt School had written their key works. Marxist-Humanists were aware of Sartre, Lukacs, Korsch, Marcuse and Adorno. Most of the Marxist-Humanist writings cited these earlier thinkers and critiqued them. By the 1980's many works of European Neo-Marxism have been translated—as has Marx's *Grundrisse* —giving the U.S. audience the necessary background for the first time to grasp the larger theoretical and philosophical themes raised by Fanon, Kosik and Dunayevskaya. These writers had anticipated, participated in and critiqued the revolutionary social movements of the 1950's and 1960's including the women's liberation movement, in ways that the low level of theoretical discussion among radical intellectuals in that period missed. In the 1980's we thus are able to view these Marxist-Humanist writings in a more comprehensive manner.

Frantz Fanon: Dialectics of the African Revolution

Nowhere is this truer than in the case of the best-known and most-studied of the three writers under consideration, Frantz Fanon. While his writings have generated a world-wide discussion, most of it until the 1970's had centered on his concepts of revolutionary violence and Black consciousness, and not his critique of neo-colonialism in post-independent Africa, on his concept of spontaneity, or most importantly of all, on his underlying concept of a humanist revolutionary dialectic, which involved critiques of single-party states in independent Africa itself.

Typical of the 1960's discussion was a French Trotskyist writer who reduced Fanon's theory to one of "armed guerrilla struggle" which he likened to Castroism (Pablo 1962). Even Sartre's preface to *The Wretched of the Earth,* focused almost entirely on the question of violence in the anti-colonial revolutions, thereby eschewing the philosophical issues raised by Fanon (1968).

In the 1970s and 1980s the newer studies focused more on Fanon's theoretical depth first as a psychologist and political theorist (Caute 1970; Gendzier 1973; McCulloch 1983) and then most recently as a humanistic philosopher of revolution (Onwuanibe 1983; Turner and Alan 1986). No Third World thinker of the post World War II era has

generated so many theoretical studies in recent years. At the same time his work continues to be discussed widely within revolutionary movements, such as in South Africa.

Yet Fanon's thought has still tended to be marginalized and excluded from much contemporary discussion on dialectics, as if Fanon's concept of revolutionary dialectics was specific to the Third World, and not universal. Onwuanibe (1983:xiii) argues against such a limited view of Fanon:

> "Fanon has a vision or project of a 'new humanism' in which he wants 'to discover, and to love man, wherever he may be' . . . he is a man struggling to reconcile the apparent contradiction between genuine humanism and violence. In order to reconcile his humanism and his espousal of violence one must consider his conception of revolution in light of the principle of self-defense on the part of the oppressed. Fanon attempts to achieve this reconciliation by placing humanism and violence in a dialectical tension."

Turner and Alan connect Fanon's humanism to his revolutionary vision of a new society in Africa in their Marxist-Humanist study of his work:

> *"The Wretched of the Earth* was to re-create the dialectics of liberation for the colonial world as it emerged out of the actual struggle of the African masses for freedom. Fanon saw the double rhythm of the colonial revolutions reflected in *both* the destruction of the old *and* the building of a totally new society" (1986:40).

While Fanon did not explicitly avow himself a Marxist, his thought can be considered in Marxist-Humanist terms.

In his famous and most-discussed chapter in *The Wretched of the Earth,* "Concerning Violence," Fanon's overall humanist and dialectical view emerges:

> "In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem . . . The natives' challenge to the colonial world is not a rational confrontation of points of view. It is not a treatise on the universal, but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute" (1968:40-1).

When Fanon makes this type of dialectical analysis, showing the philosophical dimension to his thought, such ideas are frequently not seen as original. Some argue that he derived them from Sartre or from the Negritude writers such as Aime' Ce'saire (McCulloch 1983).

In fact, Fanon had in 1952 made a very sharp critique of Sartre. Turner and Alan argue against any notion of Fanon as Sartre's "pupil."

> "In quoting Sartre's analysis of class as the 'universal and abstract' and race as the 'concrete and particular,' which led Sartre to the conclusion that 'negritude appears as the minor terms of a dialectical progression,' Fanon writes: *'Orphee Noir'* is a date in the intellectualization of the experience of being black. And Sartre's mistake was not only to seek the source of the source but in a certain sense to block that source . . . he was reminding me that my blackness was only a minor term. In all truth, in all truth I tell you, my shoulders slipped out of the framework of the world, my feet could no longer feel the touch of the ground" (cited in Turner and Alan 1986:40).

In 1955, Fanon included another sharp critique, this time of Ce'saire's concept of Negritude, in an article he published in the French journal *Esprit*:

> "Before Ce'saire, West Indian literature was a literature of Europeans . . .. In *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal* (logbook of a return to the native land), there is an African period, for on page 49 we read:
>
> > 'By dint of thinking of the Congo I have become a Congo humming with forests and rivers . . .'
>
> It thus seems that the West Indian, after the great white mirage, is now living in the great black mirage" (Fanon 1967:27-28).

This rather sharp critique, as shown later on in *Wretched of the Earth*, was because Ce'saire's Negritude was cultural only. Fanon turned against Ce'saire's view because "to Fanon, culture without revolution lacks substance" (Turner and Alan 1986:50).

In Africa, where Black consciousness became political and revolutionary in the 1950's, Fanon still argued that it needed a universal humanist revolutionary dimension if it was not to become a narrow nationalism:

> "This new humanity cannot do otherwise than define a new humanity both for others . . . National claims, it is here and there stated, are a phase that humanity has left behind . . . We however consider that the mistake, which may have very serious consequences, lies in wishing to skip the national period . . . The consciousness of self is not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee. National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is the only thing that will give us an international dimension" (1968:246-247).

In the above passage, Fanon talks in universal humanist terms while simultaneously cautioning against "wishing to skip the national period" for peoples who have been humiliated and oppressed by colonialism. His is a truly dialectical view of the relationship of national consciousness to internationalism in the Third World revolutions.

To be sure, this was rooted in Fanon's experiences in the cauldron of the hard-fought Algerian Revolution, and his own position there as a Black Caribbean in a Muslim Arab society. But it was also a development from his own earlier, pre-Algeria writings on Black consciousness. As early as 1952, he had quoted Marx, "The social revolution . . . cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future," in the concluding chapter of his *Black Skin, White Masks* (1967).

In that work he had included a discussion of the dialectic of the master and the slave in Hegel's *Phenomenology,* a topic of much discussion among French intellectuals in the 1940's. But Fanon, while greatly appreciating Hegel, also took exception to his dialectic if it were to be applied unchanged to the Black slave and the white master:

> "I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically from the master described by Hegel. For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work" (1967:220).

This original critique of Hegel which nonetheless preserved many of Hegel's categories, especially his concepts of self-consciousness and self-development, parallels some of Marx's own 1844, "Critique of the Helegian Dialectic". It also differs sharply from the 1940's French existentialist view of Hegel's master/slave dialectic with which Fanon was familiar. Following Alexandre Kojeve, the French existentialists had made this the main point of affinity between Hegel and Marx, thus grossly oversimplifying their relationship.

Fanon's dialectic of revolution rooted itself in the African peasantry and included a critique of the elitism of post-independence African leaders and nationalist parties. But as we have seen, his vision was not only political and cultural, but also philosophical. Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* was published posthumously, after cancer struck him down at the age of 36 in 1961. It offers a world concept of revolutionary dialectics. Fanon had seen the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 for example as an anti-colonial struggle, referring explicitly to Budapest (Fanon 1968:79). He had wanted to keep the new Third World independent not only of the West, but from Russian and Chinese communism as well.

Karel Kosik's Marxist-Humanism: Totality and the Dialectics of Freedom in Eastern Europe

Born one year after Fanon, in 1926, Kosik began to attain prominence in the 1950's for his sharp critiques of mechanistic, established Marxism, which in its Stalinist form had been transformed into a state ideology. A number of his articles and one book, *Dialectics of the Concrete,* have appeared in English and other Western languages. Many writers on Kosik (Piccone 1977; Bakan 1978; Zimmerman 1984) have praised his originality, but have seen it rather patronizingly as emerging not from his Marxist-Humanism in an East European context, but rather from the influence of Husserl and Heidegger. Others essentially agree with these interpretations of Kosik, but because of their own vantage point, imply that Kosik is guilty therefore of "right wing revisionism" (Moran 1983).

One Catholic Marx specialist did argue forcefully that Kosik's originality was rooted in his Marxism in an early review of *Dialectics of the Concrete:*

> "Kosik's use of an existentialist terminology . . . is neither a revolt against Communist ideas nor a cheap device of an author eager to create a sensation . . . He harvests whichever of the fruits of non-Marxist thinkers he likes, trying in each case to show that Marxist-Leninism rather than positivism or existentialism is the legitimate harvester" (Lobkowicz 1964).

Had Lobkowicz caught the difference between "Communism" and "Marxism-Leninism" on the one hand, and Marxist-Humanism on the other, then he would have seen how Kosik was sharply critiquing established Communism as well.

Raya Dunayevskaya drew a sharp contrast between Kosik's book and Adorno's *Negative Dialectics:*

> "Thus, though abstractly and indirectly articulated, no one doubted that it was an attack on the ruling bureaucracy, even if that were expressed, not in political terms, but a philosophic critique of fetishized existence. In his sharp first chapter's critique on the pseudo-concrete—an important new contribution of Karel Kosik's—he reminds the readers that "man's fetishized praxis . . . is not identical with the revolutionary-critical praxis of mankind" (1978:5).

Unfortunately, the belated 1978 publication of *Dialectics of the Concrete* in English seemed almost to end rather than begin wide discussion of Kosik among radical intellectuals. One of the translators of the book attributed the failure of even the "radical intelligentsias" in the West to take up Kosik's thought to their view that "theoretical insights come from Frankfurt and Paris" (Schmidt 1977).

Kosik's work was part of a flowering of Marxist-Humanist thought in East Europe, initially pioneered by Yugoslav Marxists who not only aided their land when it broke with Stalin in 1949, but have continued their philosophical probing and political opposition to this day with the journals *Praxis* and *Praxis International* (Markovic 1965, Golubovic 1985).

The first chapter of *Dialectics of the Concrete* begins with a searing critique of the "pseudoconcrete" world of "fetishized praxis", holding that: "To interpret the world critically, the interpretation itself must be grounded in revolutionary praxis" (Kosik 1978:7). Another critique of the pseudoconcrete is its failure to see thought as activity:

> "Cognition is not contemplation. Contemplation of the world is based on the results of human praxis. Man knows reality only insofar as he *forms* a human *reality* and acts primordially as a practical being" (1978:9).

This parallels Lenin's famous statement in his *Philosophical Notebooks* on Hegel: "Cognition not only reflects the world but creates it" (Lenin 1981:12).

Kosik sharply attacks reductionist thinking's inability to catch the new: "Reductionism is the method of 'nothing but' . . . the new is 'nothing but'—the old" (1978:14). But he is not concerned only with positivists and mechanical Marxists. He also hits out at Georg Lukacs' concept of totality when he writes:

> "The category of totality has also been well received and broadly recognized in the twentieth century, but it is in constant danger of being grasped one-sidely, of turning into its very opposite and ceasing to be a *dialectical* concept. The main modification of the concept of totality has been its reduction to *methodological* precept, a methodological rule for *investigating* reality. This degeneration has resulted in two ultimate trivialities: that everything is connected with everything else, and that the whole is more than the sum of its parts" (1978:17-18).

Kosik opposes a "ready-made or formalized whole determining the parts because the genesis and development of totality are components of its very determination" (1978:29), here criticizing as well Lukacs' French student Lucien Goldmann.

Kosik's critique of totality was developed further in a 1978 article on "The Latin American Unfinished Revolutions" by Raya Dunayevskaya in a discussion of world-wide revolutionary impulses:

> "What is new are the new groups that are appearing from the left, who want to see with the eyes of today the past two decades that would not separate the Latin American struggles from those in East Europe, or the Black revolution in the U.S. from the present struggles in South Africa, or new class struggles in West Europe from the so-called "ultra-Lefts" in China, much less allow Women's Liberation to be relegated to "the day after" the revolution. *The new is that the struggles must be considered as a totality, and as a totality from which would emerge new beginnings"* (1985:166).

Dunayevskaya had written the above article just after having reviewed Kosik's book (Dunayevskaya 1978). Kosik ends his discussion of totality with a quote from the *Grundrisse* on totality as "a process of becoming . . . of development."

Kosik's discussion on "Economics and Philosophy" first appears to challenge Marx's concept of labor based on Heideggerian categories, but then moves to call this view nothing more than "an alienated escape from alienation" (1978:42). Further on, he argues that in the twentieth century, "Scientism and all manner of irrationalism are complementary products" (1978:59). His specific reference is to Stalinism, but it could equally describe Reagan's combination of Star Wars with "creationism".

His profound four-part description of dialectical reason includes within it the concept of "a process of rationally forming reality, i.e., the realization of freedom" (1978:60). A provocative discussion of art and literature begins with the statement, shocking to the Stalinized Czechosolovakia of 1963 or today: "Poetry is not a reality of a lower order

than economics" (1978:67). He ends this chapter with a veiled but nonetheless ringing critique of totalitarianism: " . . . man is not walled into the animality and barbarity of his race, prejudices and circumstances . . . he has the ability to transcend toward truth and universality" (1978:85).

The discussion on "Philosophy and Economics" turns directly to Marx's *Capital* where Kosik disputes phenomenological Marxism's view that *Capital's* "economic content lacks a proper philosophical rationale" which "can apparently be furnished by phenomenology" (1978:98). He also rejects the view of established Marxism that "the transition from the *1844 Manuscripts* to *Capital* is a transition from philosophy to science" (1978:101).

At the same time, however, he rejects the Frankfurt School, especially Marcuse and Horkheimer, for turning revolutionary dialectics toward traditional social science:

> "A different way of abolishing philosophy is to transform it into a 'dialectical theory of society' or to dissolve it in social science. This form of abolishing philosophy can be traced in two historical phases: the first time during the genesis of Marxism when Marx, compared with Hegel, is shown to be a 'liquidator' of philosophy and the founder of a dialectical theory of society, and the second time in the development of Marx's teachings which his disciples conceive of as social science or sociology" (1978:104).

In a footnote he specifies that he is referring to Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* where the "transition from Hegel to Marx is poignantly labeled 'From Philosophy to Social Theory' " (1978:128). Moreover, Kosik also critiques Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason:* "Although Sartre correctly states that the intellectual horizon of Marxism cannot be crossed in our epoch, he 'neglects' to add, *also* of Marxism as an 'ontology of man' " (1978:130). Hence, Sartre's argument that Marxism needed the "additive" of existentialism to take up individualism and subjectivity in a humanistic manner was based on a limited view of Marx.

Thus, Kosik sees not only Stalinism, but even the Frankfurt School as promoting the abolition of philosophy within Marxism. This has negative consequences for the individual.

> "Abolishing philosophy in dialectical social theory transforms the *significance* of the seminal 19th century discovery into its very opposite: praxis ceases to be the sphere of humanizing man, the process of forming a socio-human reality as well as man's *openness* toward being and toward the truth of objects; it turns into a closedness: socialness is a cave in which man is walled in . . . man is a prisoner of socialness" (1978:106).

This is a truly revolutionary statement, given the political conditions in Czechosolovakia.

In his final statement on "Praxis and Totality", Kosik gives his own view of praxis:

> "Praxis is both the objectification of the human and the mastering of nature, and the realization of human freedom . . . Praxis is not the human's being walled in the idol of socialness and of social subjectivity, but her/his openness toward reality and being" (1978:139).

In this sense, Kosik's book is a voyage from the pseudoconcrete to the dialectics of freedom.

Dialectics of the Concrete was seized upon hungrily by the Czechoslovak intellectual world in 1963—philosophers, artists, writers, and film makers—which according to one account "accepted Kosik's concepts as its own" (Kusin 1971:53). At the Kafka

Conference of 1963, many other intellectual critics emerged and debated each other. Another historian noted that "for the first time on the soil of a socialist state and against the common front of scholars from other socialist countries, Kafka was interpreted as an artist who depicted not only the shortcomings of the capitalist society in which he lived, but also the universal human condition in modern times" (Zeman 1982). Kosik's speech on "Hasek and Kafka" deduced an explicit concept of humanism in that "while Kafka depicted the world of human reification and showed that man must experience and live through all types of alienation to be human, Hasek showed humans as capable of transcending reification and being irreducible to objects, to reified products or relations. One posited a negative, the other a positive scale of humanism" (Kosik 1975). This speech was followed in 1964 by an article on dialectics and ethics which contained a sharp critique of "the commissar" and ended with the statement: "The morality of the dialectic is revolutionary praxis" (Kosik 1977).

Kosik's contribution to Fromm's 1965 symposium *Socialist Humanism* discusses many issues, including a sharp Hegelian-Marxist critique of both Sartre and Husserl (1965). His last pre-1968 discussion was on the individual and history at a symposium held at Notre Dame University on "Marx and the Western World" in 1967 (Kosik 1967). It develops further some themes from the last chapter of *Dialectics of the Concrete,* partly out of a sharp debate with A. James Gregor, a condescending Western discussant. It concludes with Kosik's argument "that Marxism does *not* entail either a negation of the individual in terms of a history consisting of suprapersonal forces or an interpretation of the individual as a means." Kosik's rejoinder was so abstract that it left the impression that his Marxist-Humanism was not as sharp a break with Western liberalism as it was with Stalinism. Dunayevskaya argues in her analysis of the East European Marxist-Humanists, that many of them ultimately did not see the historic reason manifested in mass revolts in their countries, preferring instead, she argues, "to interpret these upsurges as if *praxis* meant the workers practicing what the theoreticians hand down" (Dunayevskaya 1973:265).

Kosik's most openly political period was brief in the crucial year of 1968, but in fact his political critique of the system in Czechoslovakia had begun in 1958 with his article on the class structure of society which argued that "nationalizing the key industries of Czechoslovakia" did not by itself create "socialism" (cited in Zeman 1982).

During this activist period in 1968, Kosik did not separate philosophy from political praxis. He held then that it is impossible to create humanistic socialism without clarifying certain basic philosophical questions (Kosik 1970). He also raised philosophical questions about the relationship of intellectuals and workers:

> ". . . we speak metaphorically about the relationship of workers and intellectuals as the union of hands and brains, or as the union of practice and theory, without realizing how false and misleading such concepts may be. The hands-brain analogy implies that workers have no brains and intellectuals have no hands, and that the union is thus based on mutual insufficiency" (Kosik 1970:395).

At the underground independent Communist Party Congress held during the Russian intervention inside a factory guarded by the working class, Kosik was elected for the first time to the Central Committee. Throughout this period he held firm. Prevented from publishing since 1968 and even having two book manuscripts stolen by police in 1975, which were returned only after direct intervention by Sartre, Kosik is an "unperson" in "normalized", i.e., Stalinist, Czechoslovakia. His thought stands to this day as a high point of East European Marxist-Humanism, which not only sums up the 1968 movement theoretically, but reaches beyond its defeat to the future.

Raya Dunayevskaya: Marxist-Humanism as Source and as New Beginning

Russian-born Raya Dunayevskaya emerges from an earlier generation of the 1920's to whom the Russian revolution was the focal point. A Communist in the 1920's and later a Trotskyist, she served as Leon Trotsky's secretary in Mexico in 1937-38, and emerged after her break with Trotsky as an original theorist with her writings on state capitalism in Russia in the 1940's (Dunayevskaya 1986). Her work on Marxist-Humanism has been almost entirely outside academia. It began in a full sense in the 1950's when her *Marxism and Freedom* (1958) for the first time considered humanism as a central category from which to grasp the whole of Marx. While that book contained the first and to this day the clearest English translation of two of Marx's key 1844 essays, as well as Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks,* its discussion of Marxist-Humanism included not only the 1844 writings, but also a substantial chapter on "The Humanism and Dialectic of *Capital,* Volume I." Marcuse's preface to the book rightly stressed its attempt "to recapture the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy" (Dunayevskaya 1958:8), but took issue with her concept of labor, prefiguring his later work on the one-dimensional society (Marcuse 1964).

One of Dunayevskaya's most original concepts is that of Hegel's absolutes as new beginnings. To be sure, she sees Hegel's central contribution to be his dialectic of freedom or of negativity. But where other Marxists such as Marcuse or Lukacs held that Hegel gives up freedom and negativity at the stage of his absolutes, thus grounding their Hegelian Marxism on earlier stages of his dialectic, Dunayevskaya plunges directly into Hegel's absolutes, as the source of her own revolutionary dialectics. This is the philosophical ground of her Marxist-Humanism. In her paper presented to the Hegel Society of America, she begins by quoting Hegel's *Science of Logic* on the absolute idea containing "the highest opposition in itself" (Dunayevskaya 1980).

As early as 1958, she had elaborated aspects of this view in relationship to political ferment in Eastern Europe, when she wrote:

> "Until the development of the totalitarian state the philosophic foundation of Marxism was not fully understood . . . we live in an age of absolutes—on the threshold of absolute freedom out of the struggle against absolute tyranny" (Dunayevskaya 1958:21-24).

The full development of her concept of Hegel's absolutes as new beginnings came her writings of the 1970's. After discussing this concept in two of Hegel's works, *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic,* her *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973) then turns to the conclusion of Hegel's *Encyclopedia,* the *Philosophy of Spirit.* Here is what she writes on the section on absolute spirit, paragraph 577: "Finally we are at "the ultimate" the final syllogism. "Suddenly" the sequence is broken . . . not only does Logic not become the mediating agent; Logic is replaced by the self-thinking Idea . . . the self-movement is ceaseless" (Dunayevskaya 1973:41). The vision she presents of Hegel is of an open dialectic reaching for the future rather than his absolutes as a closed ontology.

> She connects this directly to the East European revolts of the early 1950's: "The revolt that erupted in East Germany in 1953 and came to a climax in the Hungarian Revolution was articulated also in new points of departure in theory . . . It was as if the "Absolute Universal," instead of being a beyond, an abstraction, was concrete and everywhere" (Dunayevskaya 1973:45).

That concrete universal was the birth of Marxist-Humanism, with its stress on the individual as the social entity:

> "In Hegel's Absolutes there is embedded, though in abstract form, the fully developed "social individual", to use Marx's phrase, and what Hegel called

individuality "purified of all that interfered with its universalism, i.e. freedom itself." Freedom, to Hegel, was not only his point of departure; it was also his point of return. This was the bridge not only to Marx and Lenin but to the freedom struggles of our day" (Dunayevskaya 1973:43).

Dunayevskaya is well aware, as she puts it, that even Marx "did not think" that it was "possible for another age to make a new beginning upon Hegel's Absolutes" (Dunayevskaya 1973:45). But Marx did not, she argues, live in an age of totalitarianism emerging out of post-revolutionary societies, specifically Stalinist Russia. That is our problematic today, however, which necessitates a new look at Hegel:

> "What Hegel had shown were the dangers inherent in the French revolution, which did not end in the millenium. The dialectic disclosed that the counter-revolution is *within* the revolution. It is the greatest challenge that man has ever had to face" (Dunayevskaya 1973a:287).

All of this has created sharp debates with other Hegel scholars.

Louis Dupre (1974) and Georg Armstrong Kelly (1978) have argued that Dunayevskaya is very nearly "subverting" Hegel by substituting for Hegel's dialectic "an unchained dialectic" (Kelly 1978). Kelly's comments and her rejoinder are excerpted in Dunayevskaya's 1982 introduction to the second English edition of *Philosophy and Revolution*. That book includes, in addition to the new view of Hegel's absolutes, probing discussions of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao and Sartre as well as the revolts of the 1950s and 1960s in Africa, Eastern Europe and the U.S.

By the 1980's her *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982) had appeared, soon followed by an important discussion on Marxist-Humanism and women's liberation in *Praxis International* (Dunayevskaya 1984) and by the book of collected essays, *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (1985). By 1985 the whole of her work was being recognized in a new way at the Wayne State University Labor Archives, which opened a large exhibition on her life's work.

It is important to note that her probing into Marxist-Humanism began initially in the 1940's when she studied and wrote on Marx's concept of alienation from his *1844 Essays* as part of her studies on state capitalism. This part on alienated labor, "Labor and Society", was unfortunately refused by the editors of the Trotskyist *New International* when they did publish her economic analysis of state capitalism in those years. Her own collected papers at Wayne State show this process (Dunayevskaya 1986). That preoccupation with Marxist-Humanism continued through her first full elaboration of the concept in *Marxism and Freedom* (1958), written soon after her 1955 break with Caribbean Marxist C.L.R. James, with whom she had worked since 1941 right up through her most recent work today. Her writings on Marxist-Humanism thus preceded those of Kosik and Fanon by several years. Her *Philosophy and Revolution* directly focused on their work as part of a critical discussion of African and East European developments (Dunayevskaya 1973).

In *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982), Dunayevskaya presents a major new overview of Marx's humanism in relationship both to women's liberation and the revolutionary Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg. This book's substantial section on Marx begins with chapter nine entitled "Marx Discovers a New Continent of Thought and Revolution." There, she criticizes the limits of Lenin's Hegelianism in that he "kept his direct encounter with Hegelian dialectics—his Abstract of Hegel's *Science of Logic*—to himself" as part of the "economic mire" into which all "post-Marx Marxists" of the period "had sunk." She also critiques

Luxemburg's apparent dismissal of the *1844 Essays* after she saw parts of them, and discusses the mechanistic character of Engels' *Origin of the Family.* The conceptions of these "post-Marx Marxists"—Lenin, Luxemburg, and Engels—are contrasted to Marx's own development, beginning with his 1841 doctoral thesis, and continuing through to his *1844 Essays:*

> "What we may call "the self-determination of the Idea," Historical Materialism, which was born out of his concept of Alienated Labor, was the culmination of the critique Marx began in 1841 when he was telling his Young Hegelian friends that it was not enough to criticize Hegel for "accomodating" to the Prussian state, that what was needed was to discover the principle in Hegelian philosophy that led to that accomodation. Only in that way could one transcend the inadequacy in so genuinely historic a way as to create a new ground for a philosophy of freedom. Freedom was the bones and sinew, the heart and soul, the direction for totally new beginnings" (Dunayevskaya 1982:125-26).

This 1841 probing by Marx even before he broke with bourgeois society is connected to his dialogues in 1844 with Parisian workers, and to his pathway toward the *Communist Manifesto.*

Dunayevskaya's discussion of the *Grundrisse* stresses the dialectical nature of Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production, as opposed to Wittfogel's "twisted" view of "oriental despotism":

> "It was precisely because he (Marx) was relating all development to epochs of revolution that he could see how primitive man conserved some elements of primitive communism "in the midst of oriental despotism." Far from making a fetish of it, as the modern Wittfogels would have it, Marx was tracing the actual historical development, the forward movement from humanity's origin as a "herd animal" to its individualization in the process of history" (Dunayevskaya 1982:138-39).

But she also sees limits in the *Grundrisse,* as against the fuller development of the humanist dialectic in *Capital.*

In *Capital,* she argues, "the Subject—not subject matter, but subject—was neither economics nor philosophy, but the human being, the masses" (Dunayevskaya 1982:143). New discussion of the fetishism of commodities connects that concept to Marx's view of primitive and modern society, to his doctoral thesis, and to the "economics" of Vol. III of *Capital* as well. She points out that in the French edition of Vol. I of *Capital* (to this day unavailable in English), Marx introduced "the question of the ramifications of the extension of capitalism into the world market once the mechanization reaches a certain point and capitalism 'successively annexed extensive areas of the New World, Asia and Australia' " (Dunayevskaya 1982:148).

Chapter eleven, "The Philosopher of Permanent Revolution Creates New Ground for Organization" points to the surprising failure of post-Marx Marxists to take seriously Marx's concept of revolutionary organization in the famous *Critique of the Gotha Program.* She writes that "no revolutionary studied these notes not just as a critique of a particular tendency, but as an actual perspective for the whole movement" (Dunayevskaya 1982:157). She argues that Marx's concept of "revolution in permanence" was also ignored even as Marxists have debated Trotsky's concept of permanent revolution. She holds that, unlike Trotsky's concept, Marx's concept not only included the peasantry, but more importantly, was not "in any way separated from the total conception of philosophy and revolution" (Dunayevskaya 1982:160). These perspectives on revolutionary organization are termed especially relevant for the 1980's, when social revolutions as well as revolutionary thinkers are searching for a way out of the stranglehold of the vanguard party to lead, while holding onto Marx's overall dialectics of revolution.

Her ground-breaking chapter twelve is entitled "The Last Writings of Marx Point a Trail to the 1980's". Her Marxist-Humanist discussion of Marx's last writings there centers mainly around his 1880-81 *Ethnological Notebooks* where Marx critically assessed and summarized anthropological works on India, on Native Americans, and on Australian Aborigines. At this point, she integrates the dimension of women's liberation:

> ". . . whether Marx focused on the equality of women during primitive communism or on Morgan's theory of the gens, his point of concentration always remains that revolutionary praxis through which humanity self-developed from primitive communism to the period in which he lived . . . Marx was not hurrying to make easy generalizations, such as Engels' characterization of the future being just a "higher stage" of primitive communism. No, Marx envisioned a totally new man, a totally new woman, a totally new life form (and by no means only for marriage)—in a word, a totally new society" (Dunayevskaya 1982:186).

In her critique of Engels, the deterministic stages of history in his *Origin of the Family* are contrasted to Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks*. "Marx drew no such unbridgeable gulf between primitive and civilized as Engels had," she writes (Dunayevskaya 1982:185), because his preoccupation was not the origin of humanity, but the revolutions-to-be in those lands being penetrated by imperialism and "development". Even Marx's famous analysis of the Russian communal village which saw its structure as a possible starting point for a socialist society, in a draft of a letter to Vera Zasulich in 1881, was connected directly to the *Ethnological Notebooks*. This point was totally missed by Engels. Marx did not make a structural analysis of that village commune for, as she argues, Marx's "preoccupation is not 'the commune' but the 'needed Russian Revolution' " (Dunayevskaya 1982: 186).

She ends that penultimate chapter with a critique of revolutionary activism that "spends itself in mere anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism without ever revealing what it is *for*" (Dunayevskaya 1982: 194) and returns to her own concept of Hegel's "Absolute Idea as New Beginning". Marx's revolutionary humanism is the central focus, however:

> "What is needed is a new unifying principle, on Marx's ground of humanism, that truly alters both human thought and human experience. Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* are an historic happening that proves, one hundred years after he wrote them, that Marx's legacy is not mere heirloom, but a live body of ideas and perspectives that is in need on concretization. Every moment of Marx's development as well as the totality of his works, spells out the need for "revolution in permanence". This is the absolute challenge to our age" (Dunayevskaya 1982:195).

In her over forty years of writing on Marxist-Humanism, Dunayevskaya has woven the writings not only of Marx and Hegel, but also of other revolutionary humanists of today such as Kosik and Fanon, into a totality which is no mere summation, but a new beginning for future revolutionary praxis, and that is inseparable from philosophy. What contemporary Marxist-Humanism stresses is that Marx's Humanism was a total view that not only did not divide theory from practice, but also pointed to many tasks for the serious philosopher or social theorist.

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