they perceive to be excessive immigration? Or, to be more blunt, is the pedophile who engages in sexual acts with minors critically resisting a form of domination, i.e., a rigid regime of laws and norms that criminalize certain identities and patterns of action? It seems to me that a purely formal response to the question of normativity suggesting that resistance against whatever crystallized form of asymmetry (domination) is ipso facto critical remains unsatisfactory.

If I understand Hoy’s position correctly, we cannot expect this point to be determined a priori and the normative burden in concrete cases such as the Swedish movement and the pedophile ought to be shouldered by a situated genealogy and phronesis. However, phronesis that is not informed by (weak) universalist principles or norms might easily add up to a judgment that simply reproduces contextual biases and prejudices. And while post-critique acknowledges the significance of those principles, as mentioned above, in Hoy’s substantial argument they are, for the most part, sidelined.

At the same time, the notion of a self-conscious phronesis that Hoy derives from Derrida might serve as just one of many examples where neo-Kantians may find post-critique instructive. After all, despite the sophistication that is to be found in Habermas’s framework of justifying norms through discourse, the application of conflicting norms to a particular situation remains a largely unresolved question, given that discourses of application that Habermas refers to as a procedure for norm application appear to stand in a problematically circular relation to justificatory discourses. Here, embracing a Derridean phronesis as an alternative starting point, as Hoy suggests, may be more productive.

As these brief remarks hopefully indicate, Hoy’s masterly readings of the main figures of poststructuralism and his introduction of post-critique as a new paradigm provide ample room for discussion and take the ongoing debate between neo-Kantians and neo-Nietzscheans to a new level. If this debate yields more novel and important insights in the future, a lot of the credit will have to be attributed to David Hoy’s Critical Resistance.

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When the Shah of Iran was deposed on January 16, 1979, many Western and in particular French intellectuals greeted the event with cautious optimism. The massive urban uprising of several million people galvanized by a coalition of secular Marxists, Islamic clerics and leftist nationalists seemed to represent, to onlookers in the West, a significant new type of spontaneous and inclusive collective political movement. However, any enthusiasm for the revolution quickly waned as the coalition of secular and religious forces fell apart rapidly, turning into a form of clerical authoritarianism that was increasingly brutal in its suppression of political and religious opponents, women and other minorities. Some intellectuals were of course suspicious of the movement even prior to the toppling of the Shah. The eminent Islamic expert, Maxime Rodinson warned in December 1978 that the dominant trend within the revolutionary forces was “unquestionably a type of archaic fascism.” On January 22 the historian Le Roy Ladurie was already comparing the “chauvinist Islamism” of Khomeini and the clerics to the French Catholic fanatics who massacred thousands of protestants at the
end of the sixteenth century. And by early March, when the oppressive nature of the regime
was manifest in its summary executions of gays and its abrupt revocation of women’s rights,
prominent feminists, including Kate Millet and Simone de Beauvoir, publicly denounced
Khomeini and his fundamentalist regime.

Michel Foucault was the only French intellectual who did not join in any of these public
condemnations and continued to idealize the revolution as the expression of a new form
of “political spirituality” long after its reliance on terror was clear. In the period leading
up to the revolution, Foucault visited Iran and met frequently with French and Iranian
anti-Shah activists as well as with Khomeini himself during his exile in Paris. He also
wrote regular reports for one of Italy’s most respected daily newspapers, the Corriere
della sera, on the events unfolding in Iran. In these columns, Foucault’s admiration for
the Iranian uprising centers upon the extent to which it represents a political movement
that takes nothing from the principles of Western thinking. The anti-modernist sentiments
catalyzed by the curious confluence of religion and leftist thought contravened Marxist
stipulations on the necessarily progressive and class nature of revolutionary movement. Far
from being the ‘opium of the people,’ religion in the context of the parasitic modernity of the
Shah’s regime was a galvanizing force and Foucault was particularly fascinated by Shiite
rituals of martyrdom that were central to this emergent, and in his view, radical political
spirituality.

While Foucault’s naïve romanticization of the Iranian revolution embroiled him in huge
controversy in France, many of his English speaking biographers have tended to downplay
the episode as a lapse of judgment at odds with the political orientation of the rest of
his work. Afary and Anderson argue, to the contrary, that rather than being anomalous,
Foucault’s views on Iran are predictable insofar as they consistent with other troubling
tendencies that run through his entire oeuvre. Unlike his contemporaries, Foucault never
engaged with the issue of colonialism and had a simplified grasp of the Muslim world
derived mainly from his visits as a ‘sex tourist’ to Tunisia. His idea, not entirely unfounded,
that Muslim societies were more tolerant of sexual relations between men than Christian
ones rests, in Afary and Anderson’s view, on a misguided refusal to see that the toleration of
homoerotic culture is far from being the equivalent of the social and legal recognition sought
by gay movements in the West. Such undeveloped ideas also inform his essentially apolitical
analysis of the Iranian situation which he repeatedly characterized as an undifferentiated and
“irreducible” populist force rather than as an uneasy alliance between different ideological
factions. Afary and Anderson argue, rightly, that this exoticization of Iranian culture and,
in particular, his fascination with the discourse of martyrdom, is yet another example of the
problematic fetishization of liminal experiences that runs throughout Foucault’s thought
from his early work on madness to his final work on ethics of the self. The Heideggerian-
Orientalist subtext to his own anti-Enlightenment sentiments leads him to set up a simplistic
distinction between the modernity and its others where traditional societies – Iran, Tunisia,
ancient Greece, pre-capitalist Europe – are reified and held up as some kind of antidote to
the problems of the West. Perhaps, most problematic of all, is the way in which Foucault’s
profound and much noted indifference to issues of gender underpinned his extraordinarily
naïve assessment of the Iranian situation. Afary and Anderson compellingly document how
Foucault’s persistent failure to register the blatant repression of women that started almost
as soon as Khomeini came to power lies at the heart of his political misjudgment. It is only
in his final public statement in Le Monde on May 11, 1979 that he makes a grudging and
passing reference to the problem of “the subjugation of women and so on.” From then until
his death in 1984, Foucault said no more on the issue of Iran.
Afary and Anderson’s book is a compelling and important contribution to the mass of secondary literature on Foucault. In a valuable appendix, they bring together all of Foucault’s articles and public statements on Iran and the responses of other French intellectuals to his increasingly beleaguered position. Their account of the events leading up to the uprising and its immediate aftermath is lucid and enthralling. So too is their overall argument that Iran represents not a blip in Foucault’s views but the logical extension of his more general Nietzschean tendencies. In comparison with the mass of textual evidence considered in relation to Foucault’s views on Iran, their comparative discussion of the rest of his work is frustratingly slight and undeveloped. This means that, at points, some of their arguments are asserted rather than demonstrated, for example, the rather startling claim that, for Foucault, Khomeini personified a Nietzschean will to power. This is not the only overstatement that occasionally undermines an otherwise excellent book. They argue, for example, that the softening of Foucault’s views, in his final years, towards the legacy of the Enlightenment was the result of the public chastening he received over Iran. There might be an element of truth to this but it is a rather reductive reading of his work that fails to consider his reworking of the critical ethos of the Enlightenment in conjunction with his contemporaneous analysis of neo-liberal techniques of government and his attempt to formulate some notion of resistant agency in the idea of an aesthetics of existence. Similarly, while there is some force to their argument that the final work on Ancient Greek ethics of the self exemplifies the troubling Orientalist tendency to uncritically celebrate the ‘exotic other,’ it overlooks the significance of Foucault’s genealogical method which uses the past to denaturalize the present. It also does not sufficiently acknowledge the huge influence that Foucault’s work on sexuality has had for progressive political movements, especially gay and queer activism. Nonetheless, Afary and Anderson’s book is an important, engaging, and powerfully argued contribution to a field where it was hard to imagine that anything more of interest could be said.

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It is no easy task to provide a representative picture of a complex intellectual tradition like Critical Theory, but this is exactly what Fred Rush and his team of collaborators set out to do. Part of the problem is that it is not easy to provide a clear definition of Critical Theory. Narrowly, it refers to several generations of philosophers and social theorists associated with the Frankfurt School, the focus of the present work. One of the defining moments here is the distinction between critical theory and traditional theory, where the former has the specific practical purpose of seeking human emancipation. In its classical version, Horkheimer sketched emancipation as the attempt to liberate human beings from circumstances of enslavement. Yet such a vision of emancipation and liberation has provided the platform for many broader “critical theories” today, including feminism, critical race theory, and some forms of postcolonial criticism.

Since its inception in the 1920s, Critical Theory in the narrower sense has undergone many changes, both within and between generations. It has become common to divide Critical Theory roughly into three generations. The first generation, including figures such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin, Fromm, and Pollock, were not always in