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In the 1970s, it was commonly maintained that Lenin's materialism was undialectical, and that his dialectic was not materialist. Kevin Anderson would agree with the first part of this assessment, regarding Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908), but not the second. His thesis is that Lenin's reading of Hegel's Science of Logic in fall 1914 transformed his understanding of economic processes and revolutionary subjectivity, culminating in a new approach to imperialism, the national question, and workers' self-emancipation. Lenin failed to develop all the implications of his theoretical innovation, but explored the ground subsequently claimed by Western Marxism and critical theory. His encounter with Hegel represents a break and self-criticism in his work. It brought him closer to the still unpublished early Marx than to official versions of Marxism, whose mechanistic features, to which Lenin had subscribed in his previous writings, derive from Engels and Plekhanov, and ultimately eighteenth-century materialism.

Anderson rereads Lenin's Hegel Notebooks, following the principal transitions in The Science of Logic, and selectively incorporating contemporary research on Hegel. He describes Lenin's evolving relation to the text: from an initial dogmatic insistence on a materialist reversal, through an appreciation of the dialectic of essence and appearance, to a critical realization of the revolutionary content of Hegel's system, even at the apogee of idealism in the Absolute Idea. While even perceptive critics like Lukacs and Marcuse contrast the earlier stages of subjective spirit to a closed Absolute, Lenin identified a genuinely material content in the transition from logic to nature. Noting subtle differences between the Science of Logic and Hegel's Encyclopedia, Anderson argues that Lenin adopted the latter account, which fails to mark the similar transition from logic to spirit, but includes a more explicit reference to the will. This reading induces Lenin toward a voluntarist perspective: He ignored Hegel's insistence on the necessary synthesis of the practical and the theoretical idea, in favor of the primacy of practice. Lenin generally stressed self-movement against mechanistic causality, without fully incorporating the Hegelian concepts of freedom and subjectivity. These theoretical failures relate to defects in Lenin's political activities. He failed to subject his own earlier (1902) idea of a vanguard party to dialectical critique. With disastrous consequences, Lenin abandoned during the civil war the emancipatory theory, which he had exposed in State and Revolution, in favor of centralized direction.

Anderson also provides a useful overview of Marxist receptions of Hegel before and after Lenin. He acknowledges his debt to Raya Dunayevskaya. The book traces her changing appreciation of Lenin's achievement and its limits, partly through her unpublished correspondence. It attests to Dunayevskaya's own theoretical importance within Marxism. There are some gaps in the discussion here. Because Anderson thinks that Lukacs sees Lenin primarily as an activist, not a theorist, he is surprisingly reticent about Lukacs's Lenin (1924); but this depic-
tion of Lenin as a political practitioner depends on Lukas's theoretical claim, that Lenin grasps the actuality of revolution. Lukacs adopts a Hegelian term meaning the effectiveness of the Idea in objectivity. His stress on Lenin's concreteness implies a synthesis of universal and particular, a dialectical syllogism derived from Hegel.

Except for a small error regarding intuitive understanding, which is not a commonsense, preconceptual grasp of an object (p. 168) but a technical term meaning a concept that directly generates its object, the book effectively discusses many issues raised by Lenin's engagement with Hegel. Though Anderson advocates what he terms a unity of idealism and materialism as Marx outlined it in 1844, he does not fully address the deeper meaning of Hegel's idealism as an account of the transcendent subject, the conditions of self-consciousness, and the contradictions that various stances toward objectivity produce. These considerations would have strengthened his critique of Lenin's unilateral reading of Hegel. Nor does he examine the theory of labor as overcoming the limits of passive materialism and abstract idealism. He reads Marx's 1844 Manuscripts exclusively as a critique of Hegel's Phenomenology, not as an appropriation of the teleology chapter of the Science of Logic, whereby labor is alienated in ends, means, and results. Anderson wishes to avoid a metaphysics of labor, in order to accommodate new forms of opposition to the capitalist order. The gap in Lenin between mechanism and idealism remains. A contemporary reconsideration of the dialectic of labor might offer elements of a solution.